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Representation by Counsel or Access to
Defense Resources: Utah’s Single
Source Approach to Indigent Defense
John P. Gross*
Abstract
The State of Utah has a unique way of providing
representation in criminal cases to defendants who are too poor to
hire an attorney. In Utah, there is no statewide funding or
supervision of indigent defense. Each county, city, or town is
responsible for creating and funding their own indigent defense
delivery system. Utah is one of only two states in the United
States—Pennsylvania is the other—that fails to provide state
funding or oversight of indigent defense. But what makes Utah
truly unique is the way in which counties and municipalities are
required to structure their indigent defense delivery systems.
Utah’s Indigent Defense Act (IDA) mandates a single-source
approach to the provision of indigent defense: indigent defendants
who require additional “defense resources” to adequately prepare
for trial, such as investigators or expert witnesses, must agree to
be represented by the county or municipality’s “defense service
provider.” A defendant who elects to retain private counsel is not
entitled to additional funds from the county or municipality for
any additional “defense resources.”
This “single-source approach” does not affect those defendants
who are too poor to hire an attorney or those defendants wealthy
enough to both retain counsel and pay the cost of whatever
additional defense resources are necessary to adequately prepare
for trial. But for defendants who are marginally indigent, who
have the financial resources to retain counsel but are unable to
afford additional “defense resources,” the single-source approach
forces them to waive either their Sixth Amendment right to
*
Assistant Professor of Clinical Legal Education, Director of the
Criminal Defense Clinic, the University of Alabama School of Law.
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counsel of choice or their Fourteenth Amendment right to “the
basic tools of an adequate defense.”
Defendants have the right to select an attorney who will be the
architect of their defense, but they also have the right to “the raw
materials integral to the building of an effective defense.” Utah’s
single-source approach to indigent defense ignores the fact that
these rights are two separate and distinct constitutional rights
and conditions a defendant’s access to additional resources on a
waiver of their right to counsel of their own choice. Now that the
Supreme Court of Utah has decided that the IDA’s single-source
approach is constitutional, marginally indigent defendants in
Utah who wish to retain counsel, but also need additional defense
resources to adequately prepare for trial, have no other option
than to appeal to the Federal Courts. Whatever decision is
ultimately reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, it is abundantly clear that the IDA’s single-source
approach to indigent defense is yet another legislative effort to
avoid adequately funding an indigent defense system that would
seem to have “no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion
of constitutional rights.”
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I.

Introduction

The State of Utah has a unique way of providing
representation in criminal cases to defendants who are too poor to
hire an attorney. In Utah, there is no statewide funding or
supervision of indigent defense. Each county, city, or town is
responsible for creating and funding its own indigent defense
delivery system. Utah is one of only two states in the United
States—Pennsylvania is the other—that fails to provide state
funding or oversight of indigent defense.1 But what makes Utah
truly unique is the way in which counties and municipalities are
required to structure their indigent defense delivery systems.
Utah’s Indigent Defense Act (IDA) mandates a single-source
approach to the provision of indigent defense:2 indigent
defendants who require additional “defense resources” to
adequately prepare for trial, such as investigators or expert
witnesses, must agree to be represented by the county or
municipality’s “defense service provider.”3 A defendant who elects
1. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH, F AILING G IDEON : U TAH ’ S F LAWED
C OUNTY -B Y -C OUNTY P UBLIC D EFENDER S YSTEM , 4 (2011) [hereinafter F AILING
G IDEON ], http://www.acluutah.org/images/Failing_Gideon.pdf; see also Indigent
Defense
Systems,
Utah,
S IXTH
A MENDMENT
C TR .,
http://sixthamendment.org/the-right-to-counsel/state-indigent-defensesystems/utah/ (last visited June 8, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-303 (LexisNexis 1992).
3. Id. § 77-32-303(2); see also State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL
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to retain private counsel is not entitled to additional funds from
the county or municipality for any additional “defense resources.”
This “single-source approach” does not affect those defendants
who are too poor to hire an attorney or those defendants wealthy
enough to both retain counsel and pay the cost of whatever
additional defense resources are necessary to adequately prepare
for trial. But marginally indigent defendants who have the
financial resources to retain counsel, but are unable to afford
additional “defense resources,” are forced by the single-source
approach to waive either their Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of choice or their Fourteenth Amendment right to “the basic tools
of an adequate defense.”
II.

Utah’s Indigent Defense Act and Access to Additional
Defense Resources

The United States Supreme Court has held that defendants
who are “too poor to hire a lawyer” are entitled to counsel4 and
that “a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State
proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain
that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense.”5 Utah’s IDA recognizes the state’s dual
obligation to provide counsel and the raw materials integral to
the building of an effective defense. Pursuant to the IDA,
“indigency” in Utah means that a person “does not have sufficient
income, assets, credit, or other means to provide for the payment
of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses of
representation without depriving that person or the family of that
person of food, shelter, clothing or other necessities.”6 One
question, however, that has consistently arisen when interpreting
the IDA is whether defendants who are able to retain counsel are
also entitled to “additional defense resources” if they can
demonstrate that they are indigent.
337633, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, 2015 WL
337554, ¶ 25 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015) (describing Utah’s “single source approach to
indigent defense resources”).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
5. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
6. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2015).
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The Supreme Court of Utah first addressed this issue fifteen
years ago in State v. Burns.7 In Burns, the defendant was charged
with the murder of her six-month-old son by starvation and
dehydration. The defendant claimed that her child, who suffered
from Down Syndrome, congenital heart disease, and chronic
pulmonary disease, died as a result of these medical conditions.
The defendant’s father paid for her bond as well as counsel to
represent her, but was unable to afford the cost of a medical
expert—something that defense counsel felt necessary to provide
effective representation. As a result, defense counsel moved for
the appointment of a state-funded expert witness. At that time,
the IDA required that each county, city, and town “provide
counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial
probability of the deprivation of his liberty”8 and “provide the
investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete
defense.”9 The trial court held that to have access to funds for
expert assistance, an indigent defense provider, not private
counsel, must represent defendants.
The Supreme Court of Utah found that “the only
requirements for receiving public assistance for expert witnesses
are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence.”10 The court
explained that “[n]umerous other states with comparable statutes
have held similarly.”11 The court also noted that “[w]hile who is
paying for a defendant’s attorney may be a factor in the
determination of indigency, it is not the determinative factor.”12
In reversing the defendant’s conviction, the court concluded that
the trial court had “erroneously insisted on packaging indigent
assistance” with representation by a defense service provider.13
The year following the Supreme Court of Utah’s holding in
Burns, the IDA was amended. The amended version of the IDA
required legal counsel be assigned “to represent each indigent
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

4 P.3d 795 (2000).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-1(1) (LexisNexis 1990).
Id. § 77-32-1(3).
Burns, 4 P.3d at 801.
Id. at 803 n.6.
Id. at 802.
Id.
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and . . . provide the legal defense services necessary for an
effective defense.”14 In State v. Parduhn15 the Supreme Court of
Utah addressed whether the amended IDA had effectively
overruled Burns. Once again, relying on the plain language of the
statute, the court held that the IDA requires local governments to
provide an indigent defendant with funding for necessary defense
resources even when private counsel represents the indigent
defendant.
The court’s opinion in Parduhn addressed three cases that
involved nearly identical facts and legal issues. Each of the three
defendants involved had been deemed indigent by the district
court at the time of their initial appearance, and the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association had been assigned to represent
them. Despite being found indigent, they were able to retain
private counsel. But in doing so, the defendants exhausted their
limited financial resources. This exhaustion resulted in a request
for additional funds from the trial court to secure the services of
investigators and other expert witnesses who were considered
necessary for an effective defense. The court held that the IDA
required local governments to provide an indigent defendant with
funding for necessary defense resources, even when private
counsel represented that defendant. The court found that despite
the amendments to the IDA, the plain language of the statute
still made a distinction between legal counsel and “defense
resources.”16
Most recently, in 2012, the Utah legislature responded to the
court’s ruling in Pardhun by once again amending the IDA. The
IDA’s current version explicitly states that if a county or
municipality has established an indigent defense provider, then
“the county or municipality may not provide defense resources for
a defendant who has retained private counsel.”17 It seems clear
that the “single-source approach” required by the IDA is designed
as a cost-control measure for counties and municipalities that
14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-302(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
15. 283 P.3d 488 (Utah 2011).
16. Id. at 499 (“We first hold that out conclusion in Burns—that local
governments are statutorily required to provide an indigent defendant with
funding for a necessary defense resource, even when the defendant is
represented by private counsel—remains good law.”).
17. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-303(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
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enter into flat-fee contracts with an indigent defense provider.
Counties will no longer have to pay any additional expenses
toward defense resources for defendants who retain private
counsel. Once a county enters into an exclusive contract with an
indigent defense provider, then it will know with absolute
certainty how much money it will spend on indigent defense.
Considering the rising costs of providing indigent defense, as well
as the uncertainty associated with those costs, it is not surprising
that the legislature has adopted the single-source approach.18
III.

Recent Developments: State v. Earl19 and State v. Steinly20

The Supreme Court of Utah was recently called upon to
decide whether the “single-source approach” to providing indigent
defense required by the 2012 amendments to the IDA was
constitutional. In State v. Earl and State v. Steinly, both decided
in January 2015, the court concluded that “[a] defendant who
opts out of public representation has also opted out of public
defense resources, and nothing in the Constitution requires a
different result.”21
The defendant in Steinly claimed that the “single-source
approach” violated “his constitutional right to counsel of his
choice” because it denied to him “access to necessary defense
18. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 484 (2007)
Although a lack of data precludes precise calculations of the increase
in total number of cases assigned to indigent defense counsel, it
appears by a conservative estimate that the number of cases more
than doubled—and may have even tripled—between the early 1980s
and the beginning of this century.
See also Jacqueline McMurtie, Unconscionable Contracting for Indigent Defense:
Using Contract Theory to Invalidate Conflict of Interest Clauses in Fixed-Fee
Contracts, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773, 786 (2006) (noting that “the increase in
the use of the contract system is primarily based upon an attempt by funding
authorities to reduce costs in the face of increased prosecutions”).
19. No. 20120991, 2015 WL 337554 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015).
20. No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015).
21. Id. ¶ 22; Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 24.
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resources.”22 Similarly, the defendant in Earl claimed that she
had a right to “the resources necessary to prepare and present a
complete and effective defense,” which cannot be conditioned on
representation by an indigent defense service provider.23 In both
cases, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the constitutionality of
the IDA, reasoning that there was not a constitutional right to
what the court characterized as “unbundled legal services.”24 The
court found no problem with the legislative decision “to couple the
availability of defense resources with the retention of
government-funded counsel.”25
A. The Right to Counsel and the Right to Defense Resources
are Separate and Distinct Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court of Utah begins its analysis of the
constitutional issues raised by the defendants in Earl and Steinly
by claiming that “[t]he constitutional right to counsel
encompasses the prerogative of choosing counsel of one’s choice
and of receiving resources necessary to an adequate defense”26
and cites to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v.
Oklahoma27 in support of that claim. What the Supreme Court of
Utah overlooks is that the holding in Ake was based on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. While the appellant in Ake raised
claims regarding a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that its
holding was based on the defendant’s due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment and not on his right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment: “Because we conclude that the Due
Process Clause guaranteed to Ake the assistance he requested
and was denied, we have no occasion to consider the applicability
22. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 18.
23. Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 20.
24. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21; Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 23.
25. State v. Earl, No. 20120991, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 22 (Utah Jan. 27,
2015); State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20 (Utah Jan. 27,
2015).
26. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 19; Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 21.
27. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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of the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, in this
context.”28 This misreading of Ake resulted in the Supreme Court
of Utah proceeding under the assumption that the right to
counsel of one’s choice and the right to the resources necessary
for an adequate defense are “bundled” together in the Sixth
Amendment.
While the Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants
the right to counsel,29 the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses require that indigent defendants
have “an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly
within the adversary system.”30 The Supreme Court has viewed
discrimination against indigent defendants as a violation of the
Equal Protection clause, the Due Process clause, or both. For
example, in Griffin v. Illinois,31 the denial of a transcript to an
indigent defendant on appeal was held to be both a violation of
the Equal Protection clause because it was a form of
discrimination based on wealth and of the Equal Protection
clause because appellate review played an integral part in the
determination of guilt or innocence.32 In Ake, the Court made it
clear that an indigent defendant should have “a fair opportunity
to present his defense” based on the belief “that justice cannot be
equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is
denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”33
The Supreme Court of Utah next cites United States v.
MacCollom34 for the proposition that the right to counsel of one’s
choice and the right to receive resources to mount an adequate
defense “are qualified ones.”35 Those two rights are indeed
qualified, but the decision in MacCollom deals with the denial of
a transcript to an indigent defendant who was making a
28. Id. at 87 n.13.
29. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
30. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
31. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
32. Id. at 18.
33. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
34. 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
35. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 19 (Utah Jan. 27,
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 21 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015).
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collateral attack on his state conviction in federal court.
MacCollom does not address a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice at trial in any way. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of Utah comes to the conclusion that “[w]hen a
defendant elects an avenue that steers away from the public
representation provided by the government, he [or] she has
received the private counsel of his [or] her choice and has no
constitutional right to defense resources from a secondary source
backed by government funding.”36
The Supreme Court of Utah then cites Wheat v. United
States37 for the proposition that the “right to choose one’s own
counsel is circumscribed in several important respects.”38 Yet
none of the factors that the United States Supreme Court
identified in Wheat as justifications for limiting a defendant’s
choice of counsel are present in Earl or Steinly.39 The defendants
in Earl and Steinly had counsel that were members of the bar,
had been retained, were willing to represent them, and had no
conflicts of interest that would affect their ability to represent
them.
B. Choosing Between Constitutional Rights
The Utah Supreme Court next points out that the United
States Supreme Court has not “prescribed a single orthodoxy for
the provision of the defense resources required by the Sixth
Amendment.”40 They then cite Ake for the proposition that “the
decision on how to implement this constitutional guarantee” has

36. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 19; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 21.
37. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
38. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 22.
39. In Wheat, the United States Supreme Court mentions four instances
where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is circumscribed: 1) when the
advocate selected by a defendant is not a member of the bar; 2) when the
defendant wishes to be represented by an attorney he or she cannot afford; 3)
when a defendant wishes to be represented by an attorney who declines to
represent him or her; and 4) when the defendant wishes to be represented by an
attorney who has a previous or ongoing relationship with an opposing party.
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
40. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 22.
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been left to the states.41 In Ake, the Court specifically rejected the
idea that an “indigent defendant has a constitutional right to
choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to
hire his own.”42 That being said, the fact that states are free to
experiment with how they provide indigent defendants with
defense resources does not mean that they can require an
indigent defendant to waive their constitutional right to be
represented by counsel of their own choosing to have access to
additional defense resources. The freedom to experiment does not
encompass the freedom to make defendants choose which of their
constitutional rights to assert.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a statutory
provision that has “no other purpose or effect than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose
to exercise them” is “patently unconstitutional.”43 Whatever goal
a legislature might have, they cannot pursue that goal “by means
that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.”44
The Court has also held that “[t]o punish a person because he has
done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process
violation of the most basic sort.”45 The Court has called a
situation where a defendant is forced to surrender one
constitutional right to assert another has been called
“intolerable.”46
41. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20 (Utah Jan. 27,
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 22 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)).
42. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
43. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
44. Id. at 582.
45. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); see also North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
46. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1986)	
  
Thus, in this case [the defendant] was obliged either to give up what
he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment
claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it
intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another.
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C. The Right to Counsel of Choice is not Encompassed by the
Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel

The Supreme Court of Utah did not address the right to
counsel of choice pursuant to the Sixth Amendment in Earl or
Steinly. The court framed the constitutional question as “whether
the defense available to indigents through the exclusive source of
a public defense is adequate.”47 The court concluded that both
defendants failed to demonstrate “that the panoply of resources
provided by the public defense made available in Salt Lake
County falls short of the fundamental requirement of ‘the basic
tools of an adequate defense.’”48 But the United States Supreme
Court has made it clear that when the right to be assisted by
counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied, the quality of the
representation that a defendant receives is irrelevant.49 The
Supreme Court of Utah confuses the right to counsel of choice
with the right to effective counsel.
While an indigent defendant may not have the right to an
attorney of his or her own choosing,50 a defendant who can afford
to hire counsel does have a Sixth Amendment right to choose who
will represent him or her. The Supreme Court made it very clear
in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez51 that the Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel includes “the right of a
defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who
will represent him.”52 This right is distinct from the right to a fair
trial.53 The Court held that the erroneous denial of a defendant’s
47. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21(Utah Jan. 27,
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015).
48. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 23.
49. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006).
50. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626
(1989) (“[W]hatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment’s protection of one’s
right to retain counsel of his choosing, that protection does not go beyond the
individual’s right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance
of . . . counsel.” (citing Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
51. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
52. Id. at 144.
53. Id. at 146 (“In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of
choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the
deprivation of counsel [of the defendant’s choice] was erroneous.”).
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right to his or her counsel of choice is a type of “structural error”
which makes it “unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or
prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.”54
The Court distinguished between the “the right to counsel of
choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of
comparative effectiveness—and the right to effective counsel—
which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever
lawyer is chosen or appointed.”55
D. The Single-Source Approach and the Right to Counsel of
Choice
The real constitutional question in Earl and Steinly is
whether the IDA’s “single-source approach to indigent defense
resources” violates the defendant’s right to counsel of choice
under the Sixth Amendment. Based on existing United States
Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to counsel of choice,
Utah’s “single-source approach” seems to be unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court of Utah reaches a different conclusion by ignoring
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and by incorrectly
arguing that the right to additional defense resources derives
from the Sixth Amendment rather from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Utah’s argument that there “is
no ground for establishing a new constitutional right to
unbundled defense resources”56 shows that the court does not
recognize the separate and distinct right to counsel, the right to
counsel of one’s choice pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, or the
right to the resources necessary for an adequate defense pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. The defendants in Earl and Stanley were not
asking for unbundled legal services but merely the right to retain
counsel of their own choosing if they were financially able, and
what they were constitutionally entitled to under Ake—“the raw
54. Id. at 148.
55. Id.
56. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21 (Utah Jan. 27,
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015).
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materials integral to the building of an effective defense.”57 It is
the IDA that unconstitutionally bundles the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of the basic tools of an adequate defense.
IV.

The Economic Inefficiency of the Single-Source Approach

While the Supreme Court of Utah viewed the IDA’s singlesource approach as “rational” because the state had an interest in
making sure that funds for indigent legal defense were not
“abused or wasted” and that legal services were provided
“effectively and efficiently,” there are alternative methods of
providing indigent defense that would still satisfy those state
interests without limiting the constitutional right to counsel of
choice. Before the most recent amendments to the IDA,
marginally indigent defendants who had retained counsel could
petition the trial court for additional defense resources. The trial
court was in a position to judge whether the additional defense
resources requested were necessary to ensure an adequate
defense so that funds for indigent defense were not “abused or
wasted.”
The inefficiency of the single-source approach calls into
question its rationality. Conditioning access to additional defense
resources on the dismissal of previously retained counsel is
inefficient for two reasons. First, the time and effort that retained
counsel spent on trial preparation must be duplicated by the
newly appointed indigent defense provider, which delays the
progress of the case.58 Second, marginally indigent defendants
57. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
58. See S TANDARDS FOR C RIMINAL J USTICE : P ROVIDING D EFENSE S ERVICES
§ 5-6.2 (3d ed. 1992) (recommending that initially appointed counsel should
represent the defendant throughout the trial court proceeding because, among
other reasons, relying on a series of lawyers for representation is inefficient
because each new attorney must begin by familiarizing himself or herself with
the case and the client must be re-interviewed); Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive
Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE L.J. 1, 60–61 (1983)
Another factor affecting the cost of disqualification is the timing.
Pretrial preparation may entail considerable effort and expense.
Substitute counsel will find it necessary to duplicate many of the
tasks undertaken by the disqualified lawyer, creating even greater

REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL OR ACCESS TO
DEFENSE RESOURCES

65

must spend their limited resources retaining counsel that will
subsequently not be permitted to represent them at trial.
While the Supreme Court of Utah found this approach to be
rational, it is only rational from an economic perspective if Utah
relies on flat-fee contracts to provide indigent defense. If indigent
defense providers were compensated based on the number of
cases they handled or by the number of hours spent on a case,
then requiring marginally indigent defendants to discharge
privately retained counsel and accept representation by an
indigent defense provider would increase the costs of providing
indigent defense.
The single-source approach makes even less sense when
considering that Utah has a statute that authorizes recouping the
costs of defending a marginally indigent defendant.59 A
marginally indigent defendant who retains counsel can be forced
to repay the state for the cost of any additional defense resources.
The IDA gives the trial court the authority to “require a convicted
defendant to pay costs.”60 These “costs” include “attorney fees of
counsel assigned to represent the defendant, interpreter fees, and
investigators’ fees.”61 Payment of costs can be made a condition of
probation or suspension of sentence.62
V.

The Importance of the Selection of Counsel

Defense counsel’s influence on the strategy pursued both in
and out of court cannot be overstated.63 The Supreme Court has
long recognized that a defendant in a criminal case “requires the
expense for the defendant. Of course, if the defendant is indigent, the
public must bear the additional financial burden created by a
disqualification of defense counsel.
59. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32a-1 (2015); see also State v. Haston, 811 P.2d
929, 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“Costs, including reimbursement for legal
defense fees, may be taxed to the defendant at the court’s discretion.”).
60. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32a-1 (LexisNexis 2012).
61. Id. § 77-32a-2.
62. Id. § 77-32a-6.
63. See, e.g., Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of
Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 363 (2003).
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guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him.”64 Because the defendant bears the consequences of a
conviction, selecting counsel to assist in his or her defense is a
highly personal choice. The selection of defense counsel has been
described as “the most important decision a defendant makes in
shaping his defense.”65 In deciding that the “erroneous
deprivation of the right to counsel of choice” qualifies as
“structural error,” the Supreme Court noted the profound effect
that the selection of counsel will have on the outcome of a case:
Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with
regard to investigation and discovery, development of the
theory of defense, selection of the jury, presentation of the
witnesses, and the style of witness examination and jury
argument. And the choice of attorney will affect whether and
on what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution,
plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial. In light of these
myriad aspects of representation, the erroneous denial of
counsel bears directly on the framework within which the trial
proceeds—or indeed on whether it proceeds at all.66

The Court has also pointed out that the “language and spirit of
the Sixth Amendment contemplates that counsel, like the other
defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a
willing defendant.”67 While certain decisions concerning the
progress of a criminal case are reserved exclusively to the
defendant, defense counsel has the power to decide on trial
strategy and tactics, including which witnesses to call, whether
and how to conduct cross-examination, which jurors to accept or
strike, which trial motions should be made, and what evidence
should be introduced.68

64. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
65. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979); see also United
States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir. 1988) (“A defendant’s right to
choose an attorney is a corollary of the right to decide what type of defense the
accused will present.”).
66. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (citations
omitted).
67. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
68. Id.
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Utah’s Failing Indigent Defense System and the Effect of
the Single-Source Approach

Despite the Supreme Court of Utah’s suggestion that
indigent defendants have access to a “panoply of resources,”69
Utah’s indigent defense system is regarded as one of the worst in
the nation. A report by the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association found that Utah ranked third to last of the fifty states
in per capita spending on indigent defense, spending just $5.22
per person, whereas the national average was $11.86.70 Because
Utah shifts the burden of providing counsel to indigent
defendants from the state to counties and municipalities, “a
patchwork of models exists across the state.”71 Most counties in
Utah “rely on contracts with private attorneys to represent
indigent defendants” and “not all of these private attorneys are
able to devote all of their time to contracted indigent clients.”72
A. Flat-Fee Contracts for Providing Indigent Defense
There are three models for the provision of indigent defense
services: 1) a public defender office; 2) an assigned counsel
program; and 3) contracts with private attorneys. The American
Bar Association (ABA) does not endorse the use of contracts “as a
viable, separate, ‘stand-alone’ component for the delivery of
defense services.”73 The ABA has found that “the use of flat-fee
contracts with competitive bidding by potential providers of
services, based solely on a concern for the cheapest possible
system” fails “to provide quality representation to the accused.”74
69. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21 (Utah Jan. 27,
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015).
70. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A R ACE TO THE B OTTOM : S PEED
AND S AVINGS O VER D UE P ROCESS : A C ONSTITUTIONAL C RISIS (June 2008),
http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_report.pdf.
71. Marina Lowe, Indigent Defense in Utah: Constitutionally Adequate?, 22
UTAH B. J. 22, 24 (2009).
72. Id.; see also F AILING G IDEON , SUPRA NOTE 1, at 3 (“Most Utah counties
follow the contract counsel model.”).
73. S TANDARDS FOR C RIMINAL J USTICE , SUPRA NOTE 58, § 5-1.2.
74. Id.
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Flat-fee contracts have been widely criticized as a method for
providing indigent defense services because their primary goal is
not quality representation, but instead, cost control.75 The
Arizona Supreme Court even found that in one county, their use
violated an indigent defendant’s right to counsel.76
A recent report by the American Civil Liberties Union of
Utah concluded that in each of the nine counties they studied,
“the public defender system fails Gideon in almost every (if not
every) respect.”77 The report found public defenders were
“chronically underfunded and overworked, with some handling
caseloads that, based on the contract fee, result in $400 (or less)
per felony.”78 There was “little or no monies set aside in the public
defense budgets for investigative, expert, or other resources
necessary to build an adequate defense in many cases.”79 In many
of the counties, the county attorney “has a hand in selecting
which attorneys will be awarded the public defender contracts.”80
None of the counties had “minimum qualifications or criteria to
actually be a public defender.”81 The report characterized Utah’s
county-by-county public defender system as a “failure” and
pointed out that caseloads are so high that they render competent
representation impossible and that there is a “systemic
75. Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts
for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1808 (2000)
While overwhelming caseloads and inadequate funding plague
indigent defense systems of all types, there is a growing consensus in
the legal community that low-bid contract systems—under which the
state or locality’s indigent defense work is assigned to the attorney
willing to accept the lowest fee—pose particularly serious obstacles to
effective representation;
McMurtie, supra note 18, at 787 (noting that the ABA and NLADA have
promulgated standards and guidelines for contracting defense services but “the
trend has been to award contracts on the basis of cost alone, leading to an
erosion of the constitutional principle of the right to counsel and the diminishing
of lawyers’ professional responsibilities”).
76. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d. 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
77. F AILING G IDEON , supra note 1, at 7.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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deficiency” in providing the investigatory resources necessary for
a complete defense.82
B. The Choice Between Counsel and Defense Resources for the
Marginally Indigent
Marginally indigent defendants are not required to choose
between two equally good indigent defense systems, one privately
funded and one publicly funded. The choice that marginally
indigent defendants face is to either retain an attorney that they
believe has the ability to adequately defend them but forgo any
additional defense resources, or to be represented by an indigent
defense provider who struggles to find the time to adequately
represent all of his or her clients but may have access to
additional defense resources. Marginally indigent defendants in
Utah may conclude that they are better off without additional
defense resources if, to access them, an overwhelmed public
defender must represent them. The IDA makes an indigent
defense provider “an organ of the State interposed between an
unwilling defendant” and his choice of counsel.83
The IDA’s single-source approach is so extreme that it
appears to deny indigent defendants the right to additional
defense resources even if an attorney who did not receive
compensation represented them. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendants the right to be represented by either a
qualified attorney that they can afford “or who is willing to
represent the defendant even though he is without funds.”84 The
single-source approach completely disregards a defendant’s right
to counsel of choice, even when an attorney volunteers to
represent a defendant pro bono, so that counties and
municipalities in Utah can limit the costs associated with
providing indigent defense through the use of flat-fee contracts.

82. Id. at 9–10.
83. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
84. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (citing
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1989)).
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VII.

Conclusion

Defendants have the right to select an attorney who will be
the architect of their defense, but they also have the right to “the
raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.”85
Utah’s single-source approach to indigent defense ignores the fact
that these are two separate and distinct constitutional rights and
conditions defendants’ access to additional resource on a waiver
of their right to counsel of their own choice. Now that the
Supreme Court of Utah has decided that the IDA’s single-source
approach is constitutional, marginally indigent defendants in
Utah who wish to retain counsel, but also need additional defense
resources to adequately prepare for trial, have no other option
than to appeal to the Federal Courts. Whatever decision the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ultimately
reaches, it is abundantly clear that the IDA’s single-source
approach to indigent defense is yet another legislative effort to
avoid adequately funding an indigent defense system that would
seem to have “no other purpose or effect than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights.”86

85.
86.

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).

